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Abstract 
 
This chapter examines the FN in the current French party system. It looks at the extent to which ‘de-
demonization’ has changed the party’s strategic and programmatic profile. We ask whether these changes 
have affected the status of the party across three main aspects as political outsider, niche and radical party, 
and consider the internal and external stimuli for party modernization. We conclude that, despite the 
moderation of its rhetoric and the softer packaging of its policies, the FN has not yet shed its populist 
radical right profile, and that de-demonization is primarily a vote-maximizing strategy. De-demonization is 
increasingly putting the cordon sanitaire under pressure however, creating new competitive opportunities 
for the FN. 
 
 
 
 
For over four decades, the French Front National (FN) has epitomized the populist radical 
right party in Western Europe (Mudde, 2007: 41). According to Rydgren (2005), the FN 
has pioneered a new potent ‘master frame’ combining ethno-nationalist xenophobia with 
anti-political-establishment populism, which has shaped political mobilization by the 
European PRR during the 1980s. The electoral development of the FN has been 
associated with the mobilization of a specific set of issues alongside the ‘cultural’ 
dimension of competition (Kitschelt 1995). The FN’s focus on immigration and crime has 
created a niche in the electoral arena, galvanizing radical right voters since the mid-1980s 
(Perrineau 1998). The FN represents also the archetypal ‘political pariah’ secluded 
behind the cordon sanitaire because of its historical legacy of French far right extremism. 
 
Since Marine Le Pen’s accession in 2011, however, the FN has claimed to break away 
from its extreme right status. Changes in the party’s strategic and programmatic profile 
have been embedded in the rhetoric of ‘dédiabolisation’ (de-demonization). Party 
normalization emerged immediately after the 2002 presidential election and has been 
central ever since to the new course set by Marine Le Pen for her party 1. The recent 
electoral rejuvenation of the FN suggests that de-demonization has allowed the radical 
right to broaden its support base, setting new historical records in the 2012 presidential 
and 2014 European elections with 17.9 and 24.9 per cent of the vote, respectively. 
 
                                                 
1
 Similar attempts had been made in the past. In the mid-1980s, the strategy of ‘notabilization’ had 
materialized in the Rassemblement National (RN), attracting right-wing defectors such as Bruno Mégret. In 
the 1990s, the rise of Mégret’s modernist faction paved the way for tactical pacts with local leaders of the 
non-Gaullist Right in the 1998 regional elections. 
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However successful electorally, de-demonization is still a debated issue. Most journalistic 
accounts of ongoing FN modernization tend to focus on changes in the party’s narratives. 
Marine Le Pen has undeniably succeeded in presenting a more amenable face for her 
party in the media, but there is little evidence of more substantial changes to the FN’s 
ideology, culture and party system status beyond this softer ‘packaging’ (Dézé 2012, 
Crépon 2012, Mayer 2013, Shields 2013). 
 
This chapter looks at the extent to which ‘de-demonization’ has altered the party’s 
strategic and programmatic profile. We assess changes in the status of the FN across three 
main aspects as political outsider, niche and radical party, which all represent strategic 
features of the populist radical right family. We then look at stimuli for party 
modernization, both internal and external, and the factors which have induced the new 
FN trajectory after 2002. We conclude that the party has not yet shed its populist radical 
right profile despite the moderation of its rhetoric and the softer packaging of its policies, 
and that de-demonization is primarily a vote-maximizing strategy. 
 
 
1. Aspects of party change 
 
This first section looks at the strategic and programmatic changes embedded in ‘de-
demonization’. It asks whether the FN has become more ‘mainstream’ over time. 
Changes are evaluated across three main aspects of niche, radical and outsider party. 
 
1. Niche 
 
RRPPs parties have emerged as ‘niche’ parties in West European party systems. 
According to Meguid (2008), niche parties are distinguished from the mainstream by the 
emphasis they put on certain issues which are neglected by their more established 
competitors. RRPPs parties compete primarily on a set of cultural issues such as 
immigration and crime, and they tend on the other hand to ‘de-emphasize’ economic 
matters (Rovny 2013). 
 
Whether RRPPs are shedding their niche profile can be measured by the salience they 
attach to various policy domains. Changes in the salience profile of the FN are examined 
using the Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP) data for France 2. CMP data provide 
party specific measures of the relative salience of political issues in party platforms 
across time (Budge et al. 2001). To assess the niche status of the FN, we measure the 
deviation from the mean salience of the social-economic and socio-cultural policy 
domains 3. According to Meyer and Wagner (2013), a party de/emphasizes an issue more 
than its competitors if its salience is at least one standard deviation below/above the mean 
party system salience 4. 
                                                 
2
 The original CMP dataset is complemented with the coding of all French party manifestos in the 2012 
elections –which at the time of writing were still uncoded. 
3
 To ensure consistency with the comparative analyses in this volume, the salience of socio-economic 
issues is calculated by adding up categories per401 till per416, as well as categories per504 till 507. The 
salience of socio-cultural issues is calculated by adding up issues per601 till per608. 
4
 Party system salience is calculated for all parties other than the FN. We use non weighted measures. 
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Figure 1. Changes in the FN’s economic and sociocultural salience profile 
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The economic and sociocultural salience profiles of the FN relative to the other actors in 
the French party system are summarized in Figure 1. The data reveal that the FN has 
indeed broadened its programme over time to include a larger set of socio-economic 
issues. The latter made up 38 per cent of its 2012 manifesto as opposed to 15 per cent in 
the mid-1990s. Simultaneously, there has been a decrease in socio-cultural salience from 
44 down to 24 per cent since 1997. A brief glance at the structure of the 2012 presidential 
platform confirms this shift in issue emphasis, with household income, the Euro, 
employment, public debt, pensions and taxes coming before traditional issues of 
immigration and law-and-order. 
 
In party system terms, the FN continues to differentiate its policy agenda from other 
competitors on the socio-cultural dimension, while simultaneously pursuing mainstream 
strategies on socio-economic issues. In 2012, the FN maintained a distinctive niche status 
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on socio-cultural issues compared with the other French parties, with a difference to the 
mean of about two standard deviations. On economic issues, on the other hand, the party 
has adopted a more mainstream profile –with a difference in salience smaller than the 
standard deviation in the French party system– which suggests a move towards office-
seeking strategies. 
 
These results corroborate the ‘valence’ agenda pushed by Marine Le Pen to profile her 
party as a more credible party of government. Economic issues were already prioritized 
in the 2007 election 5 and party ‘technocratization’ has been central ever since to Marine 
Le Pen’s agenda of normalization. The greater emphasis put on economic credibility was 
revealed for instance by the appointment of a former high ranking administrative civil 
servant, Florian Philippot, as strategic campaign director in October 2011. During the 
presidential campaign, the FN made every effort to present a credible costing for its 
socio-economic programme, while simultaneously seeking expert advice on its plan to 
shed the Euro. 
 
Despite significant changes in salience profile, however, the FN has not yet shifted from 
niche to mainstream status. As public demand for anti-immigration policies grows, there 
are strong vote-seeking incentives for the FN to maintain its distinctive focus on socio-
cultural issues. In 2012, the two most important issues reported by Le Pen’s supporters 
were immigration (77 per cent) and crime (54 per cent) (IPSOS-Fiducial exit-poll survey, 
22 April 2012). French voters are now even more concerned about immigration, national 
identity or crime. Polls show high levels of public opinion support for the FN’s cultural 
views (see Table 1 below). The vast majority of the French hold negative opinions of 
Islam and adhere to the FN’s claim that there are too many foreigners in the country. 
 
 
Table 1. Salience of the FN niche cultural agenda 
Item % agree 
There are too many foreigners in France 66 
Islam is not compatible with the values of French society 63 
We should give more power to our country even if this limits that of the EU 70 
In France, things were better in the past 74 
In general, foreigners don’t make much of an effort to assimilate in French society 59 
We need a strong leader in France to put everything in order 84 
Politicians don’t really care about people like us 88 
Most men and women in French politics are corrupt 65 
Source: IPSOS-CEVIPOF survey. Les Nouvelles fractures françaises, January 2014 (http://www.ipsos.fr/ipsos-public-
affairs/actualites/2014-01-21-nouvelles-fractures-francaises-resultats-et-analyse-l-enquete-ipsos-steria: retrieved 7 June 
2014) 
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 These issues topped the agenda of the FN’s summer university in Avignon in September 2006, where the 
party set up thematic committees (Commissions d’Action présidentielle, CAP) to tap a wide range of socio-
economic issues in order to enhance its sectoral expertise. 
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In contrast, the party’s economic strategy lacks credibility and is met with strong public 
skepticism. Claims by the party that it is preparing itself to assume power hardly conceal 
the flaws in its economic programme and the uncertainty regarding its Euro-exit platform 
which is rejected by the vast majority of French voters. Looking at the FN’s platforms 
since the mid-1980s, Ivaldi (2013) suggests also that the party has shifted to the left on 
the economic axis of competition, endorsing a new domestic economic agenda of state 
intervention, government spending and public services expansion, while simultaneously 
accentuating economic nationalism and anti-globalization. 
 
 
2. Radical 
 
The French FN epitomizes the populist radical right, which according to Mudde (2007) 
combines nativism, authoritarianism and populism. Nativism is defined as “an ideology, 
which holds that states should be inhabited exclusively by members of the native group 
(‘the nation’) and that nonnative elements (persons and ideas) are fundamentally 
threatening to the homogenous nation” (p.19). Nativism is core to the ideological profile 
of RRPPs and implies welfare chauvinist, ethno-differentialist and Eurosceptic policies. 
Authoritarianism refers to “the belief in a strictly ordered society, in which infringements 
of authority are to be punished severely” (p.23). Finally, populism is defined as “a thin-
centred ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous 
and antagonistic groups, ‘the pure people’ versus ‘the corrupt elite’. It argues that politics 
should be an expression of the volonté générale, i.e. the general will of the people 
(Mudde 2004). 
 
To what extent has the new political marketing of ‘de-demonization’ altered the nativist, 
authoritarian and populist beliefs of the FN? In this section, we examine the content of 
FN presidential manifestos from 2002 to 2012. Party programmes are analyzed 
exhaustively in order to extract all policy pledges that form part of the FN’s radical 
agenda, reflecting changes in the specific policy commitments made by the party over 
time. Although nativist, authoritarian and populist policies are radical ‘in essence’, they 
may vary however according to their formulation and the degree to which they challenge 
constitutional rules or universalist values. Pledges are therefore coded on a 3-point scale 
to differentiate between extreme (+1), moderate (+.5) and status quo (0) positions. They 
are then assigned to one of the following categories –nativism, authoritarianism or 
populism. To improve coding consistency, a unique ID is attributed to each individual 
policy pledge, which allows also to trace changes in specific issue positions over time. 
Let us note here that no liberal, cosmopolitarian or progressive positions were found that 
would require to consider opposite scores such as those used by Akkerman (2012). 
Pledges to maintain the existing status quo were also almost inexistent. 
 
Figure 2 below has the size and structure of the FN’s radical agenda in presidential 
elections between 2002 and 2012. The overall size of the FN’s radical platform shows a 
significant decrease in 2007 where the total number of radical policy pledges was halved 
from 106 in 2002 down to 58, followed by an augmentation up to a total 80 proposals in 
2012. The 2002 manifesto stands out also as significantly more radical with regards to the 
overall number of ‘extreme’ policies across all three measured dimensions (62 as 
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opposed to 21 and 32 in 2007 and 2012, respectively). 
 
 
Figure 2. Size and degree of extremeness in the FN’s radical agenda*: 2002-2012 
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The use of unique policy pledge IDs over time allows to track changes in the policy 
profile of the FN. We distinguish between three main groups of policies. A first group 
concerns the stable radical right core of the FN. It consists of a total of 59 policies that 
can be found across the whole 2002-2012 period 6. More than half (54.2 per cent) of 
those are nativist policies, while authoritarian and populist policies account for another 
quarter (25.4) and fifth (20.3), respectively. This stable radical right core includes some 
of the FN’s historical policies such as the repatriation of all illegal immigrants and 
foreign offenders, the end of legal immigration, a drastic reduction in asylum, national 
preference, opposition to the building of mosques, death penalty and a more severe 
punishment for offenders and criminals including minors aged 13+, the suppression of 
family reunion rights for migrants, more powers to the police, the fight against “anti-
French racism”, an exit from Schengen and ultimately from the EU, a call for discipline 
and authority in schools, the fight against trade union monopolies and against the 
politicization of civil servants, or the greater use of the referendum and proportional 
representation. All policies in this first group exhibit stability in their goals and show also 
little variation with regards to their degree of ‘extremeness’: cases where the FN has 
adopted a more moderate position in 2012 compared with ten years earlier represent 
about a fifth (22 per cent) of all 59 policies in this stable radical right group, the most 
notable change being the party’s official position now acknowledging abortion rights. 
 
                                                 
6
 Of these, 38 are present in all three manifestos, while another 21 are only common to the 2002 and 2012 
programmes. 
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The second group refers to new radical right policies which have emerged in the 2012 
party’s manifesto and which can be regarded as representative of Marine Le Pen’s 
modernization agenda. This second group has a total of 21 policy pledges of which more 
than half (57.1 per cent) have a focus on law-and-order issues –in particular repression 
against violent behavior in schools, more rights for victims in courts, citizen supervision 
of criminal trials or the suppression of social welfare for repeat offenders. Another third 
(33.3 per cent) concern nativist policies, mostly articulated around the new secular 
agenda and the fight against “communautarisme”, as well as anti- immigration measures 
such as a legal ban on undocumented migrant regularization. 
 
The third group contains the FN’s old radical right policies abandoned after 2002. In 
about half (48.9 per cent) of the cases, these concern nativist policies, in particular 
proposals such as national preference in company layoffs, the dismantling of emergency 
homes for migrants, sanitary controls at France’s borders to fight AIDS, a safety deposit 
for tourists, the control of naturalization of migrants by municipal councils, extended 
powers to the police to check migrants or a compulsory medical examination for visa 
applicants. For another third (34 per cent), these old policies refer to law-and-order issues 
such as police checks in schools, forced labor camps for offenders and criminals, or 
restoring high-security quarters in prisons. With regards to the degree of extremeness, it 
must be noted than this third group shows no statistically significant differences with 
policies in the former two groups i.e. the stable radical right core and the more recent 
policies adopted in 2012. 
 
These results suggest that the FN has somewhat de-radicalized over the past ten years. 
The party has shed a number of its former extreme nativist and authoritarian policies 7 
while simultaneously moderating its social conservative views on issues such as abortion 
or civil union 8. From 2007 onwards, the FN has shown a strategic reformulation of its 
ethnopluralist platform, downplaying national identity issues 9 to focus on the alleged 
stand-off between Islam and liberal democracy. The 2012 campaign referred to the so-
called threats of ‘islamization’ and ‘green fascism’ in French society. To evade 
accusations of racism or xenophobia, the party has endorsed the secular values that are 
pivotal to the French Republican model of immigrant integration 10. Finally, other 
significant behavioral changes include the shedding of anti-Semitism and Holocaust 
                                                 
7
 In 2002, the Pour un avenir français presidential programme prioritized the ethno-differentialist 
arguments laid out in Mégret’s 50 propositions on immigration in 1991. Immigration was depicted as a 
‘deadly threat to France’s identity’ that ‘profoundly alters the very substance of the French people’, while 
the party pledged to ‘halt the islamization of France’. 
8
 Together with Marine Le Pen’s personality, this sidelining of traditional and religious issues has helped 
the party overcome the gender gap inherent in PRR male chauvinistic politics (Mayer 2013). 
9
 Quite remarkably, the terms ‘national identity’ would appear only once in 2007, and would be found in 
the chapter dedicated by the FN to the environment. The party would also limit itself to pointing out the 
risk of Islamic terrorism for national security and French laicity. Other possibly disorientating policy moves 
included for instance the release in December 2006 of electoral posters portraying a young black woman 
wearing low-waisted jeans and a piercing. 
10
 Such evolution was not entirely novel to the FN. A similar line had temporarily surfaced in the 1999 
European elections, in intra-party controversy over ‘multi-denominational France’. This realpolitik of 
immigration and multiculturalism had been abandoned however as the FN confronted ideological 
competition from the neo-racist islamophobic platform of splinter MNR. 
8 
 
denial which were customary of Jean-Marie Le Pen in the past, without formally 
condemning such statements. However effective in terms of political marketing, the new 
policy ‘packaging’ should not conceal the persistence of a substantial and stable nativist, 
authoritarian and populist ideology characteristic of the radical right. Moreover, the 
recent cultural policies adopted by the FN in 2012 show no significant departure from the 
more established radical right core. 
 
 
3. Outsider 
 
Anti-establishment populism is a strategic feature of the PRR. According to Schedler 
(1996), anti-political-establishment parties symbolically construct a double conflict 
contraposing the political elite against citizens and against themselves. For over four 
decades, the French FN has operated on this form of radical opposition to the system, 
vilipending ‘decadent’ and ‘corrupt’ elites, opposing the ‘gang of four’ in reference to the 
parties of the mainstream, while simultaneously claiming to speak for the ordinary 
people. The FN represents also the archetypical ‘outsider’ party, kept out of mainstream 
politics by the cordon sanitaire, and often being no more than an electoral nuisance for 
other parties. The FN has never achieved coalition potential at national level and only on 
rare occasions it has shared power in local or regional governments. 
 
De-demonization aims to shed the FN’s pariah status in order to get more public 
legitimacy and augment its electoral appeal. During most of the 1990s and early 2000s, as 
a result of its ostracization by the RPR/UDF cartel, the FN pursued mainly adversarial 
strategies vis-à-vis the mainstream right, although it managed to forge tactical regional 
alliances in 1998. The party’s ‘neither left nor right’ strategy was epitomized in the 1997 
and 2002 elections, which demonstrated also its nuisance against both camps. In 2007, Le 
Pen only temporarily toned down the FN’s traditional anti-political-establishment 
rhetoric, claiming to be ‘centre-right’ and explicitly calling for co-operation with 
Sarkozy’s right. In 2012, the party returned to its role as political nuisance. Le Pen’s 
strong anti-UMP campaign had a significant impact, depriving Sarkozy of the votes 
needed to defeat Hollande in the presidential runoff 11. 
 
Since Marine Le Pen’s accession to power, the party has returned to the ‘two-tier’ 
competitive strategy that had been briefly endorsed by the party in the late 1990s, and 
which is characterized by the dominance of anti-political-establishment populism (Ivaldi 
2007). At national level, the FN persists in its violent attacks against mainstream parties 
and the so-called ‘UMPS caste’ 12. The party claims to represent a third competitive bloc 
and a political alternative to France’s two-bloc polity, while simultaneously ruling out co-
operation with other actors in the system. The FN opposes also the existing political 
status quo –as revealed for instance in its opposition to European integration, while 
challenging the fundamental pluralist principles. The anti-liberal culture of the FN is 
                                                 
11
 Polls indicated that only half of the FN voters supported Sarkozy, throwing the election to Hollande. 
12
 In the 2012 presidential runoff, Marine Le Pen refused to endorse either candidate, while vilipending the 
‘evil’ forces of ‘mondialisme’ (globalism) i.e. the EU, financial markets, multinational corporations, 
immigration and France’s political ‘establishment’. 
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exemplified by its critique of intermediary bodies, constitutional courts, checks and 
balances, parliamentarianism or trade unions. At sub-national level, on the other hand, the 
FN seeks political désenclavement. It has adopted a more conciliatory approach in the 
2012 legislatives, calling for local pacts with the UMP, a position which was reiterated in 
its 2014 municipal election charter. Vertical differentiation of the party’s competitive 
strategies is corroborated also by the variation in its policy platforms. In the 2014 
municipals, the FN has adopted a right-wing agenda combining anti-immigration, law-
and-order with tax cuts and the fight against local bureaucracy, which contrasted with its 
more leftist and statist positions in the national arena. 
 
Significant changes have occurred in the FN’s political environment. The electoral 
revival and softening of the FN’s image are certainly putting the cordon sanitaire under 
strain. Since 2002, the UMP has maintained a strict demarcation from the FN, repeatedly 
reiterating its exclusionary stance vis-à-vis the radical right. In 2012, however, Sarkozy 
pushed the political legitimation of the FN one step further by acknowledging the 
‘democratic nature’ of Marine Le Pen’s party and its ‘compatibility with Republican 
values’. Recent years have also seen the deterioration of the Front Républicain 13 after the 
mainstream right has adopted a ‘neither, nor’ strategy. Since 2011, the UMP has 
maintained its candidates in all three-way contests, urging voters to reject both the FN 
and the Left. This has created a more favorable structure of opportunity in constituencies 
with strong FN presence, particularly in the Southern regions. 
 
The FN seems to begin reaping the fruits of these efforts to polish the party’s image. 
Public opinion data point to the increasing normalization of Marine Le Pen’s party (see 
Table 2). In 2014, only 50 per cent of the French said that ‘the FN was a threat to 
democracy’ compared with 75 per cent in the mid-1990s. Other indicators of de-
demonization include popularity ratings for both the FN and its leader, which have 
doubled since Marine Le Pen’s accession, as well as public support for the FN’s ideas 
which are now shared by over a third (34 per cent) of the French. 
 
 
Table 2. Public opinion indicators of de-demonization: 1997-2012 
 1997 2002 2007 2014 
Average % FN popularity(1) 13 11 12 23 
Average % leader popularity(1) 15 13 13 27 
Is threat to democracy (%) 75 70 60 50 
Agreement with FN ideas (%) 20 28 26 34 
(1)
 Annual average of monthly popularity ratings 
Source: TNS-SOFRES popularities and annual barometer surveys 
 
 
                                                 
13
 The Republican Front (Front républicain) consists of ad hoc local alliances of parties across the spectrum 
wherever and whenever a radical right candidate is likely to win a decisive round. 
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2. Conditions for party change 
 
This second section looks briefly at the internal and external stimuli for FN party 
transformation and the contextual factors which help account for changes that have 
occurred in the FN’s policy and strategic profile. Harmel and Janda (1994) suggest that 
“party change is normally a result of leadership change, a change of dominant faction 
within the party and/or an external stimulus for change” (p.262). It is therefore important 
to look at “the parties’ own decision-making processes in effecting organizational 
change” (p.261). However, agent-based models are not sufficient to explain party change. 
We also need to consider the broader political and institutional context in which parties 
operate. 
 
 
1. External stimuli for change 
 
The strategic choices made by the FN must be first situated within the political context of 
the 2002 ‘earthquake’ presidential election. Jean-Marie Le Pen’s progression to the 
second-round runoff was the paroxysm of the FN as electoral nuisance. Mass anti-FN 
mobilization between the two rounds demonstrated however strong resistance to the far 
right and its continuing political exclusion. It helped contain the growth in support for Le 
Pen in the decisive round, resulting in Chirac’s reelection with over 82 per cent of the 
vote. Le Pen’s success in trompe l’oeil suggested that the FN had hit its electoral ceiling, 
contradicting its claim to represent a viable political alternative. The relatively poor 
showing by the FN in the subsequent legislatives attested to its lack of support. Finally, 
the election campaign revealed the low economic credibility of the party. 
 
The 2002 (mis)performance was bitterly disappointing to the party’s rank and file, and it 
acted as a powerful catalyst for party change. The FN entered a period of internal turmoil 
and intense fractionalization over party strategy, creating opportunities for the 
‘modernist’ factions. Modernization was brought to the agenda of the 2003 party 
congress by the younger generation of elite around Marine Le Pen –e.g. Olivier 
Martinelli, Louis Aliot or Jean-François Touzé–, while Marine Le Pen was also appointed 
as vice-president. In 2007, she was given the strategic direction of the presidential 
campaign. As noted earlier, significant attempts were made to soften the party’s image 
and to formulate more credible economic policies which were felt to be missing in 2002. 
Le Pen’s family autocratic leadership led to the departure of prominent national cadres 
such as Jacques Bompard, Carl Lang or Jean-Claude Martinez 14. 
 
Strategic issues resurfaced immediately after the 2007 elections. Despite the FN’s poor 
presidential showing, Marine Le Pen emerged as the most serious contender for taking 
over the party 15. Her political momentum profoundly altered the factional balance of 
                                                 
14
 Jacques Bompard was expelled in September 2005; Carl Lang et Jean-Claude Martinez left the party in 
November 2008. Other key figures such as Martine Lehideux, Martial Bild, Myriam Baeckeroot, Michel 
Bayvet and Michel de Rostolan stepped down in January 2009. 
15
 Marine Le Pen’s ability to survive the legislative debacle in her Northern constituency made her the 
frontrunner in the succession race to replace her father. Highly publicized local campaigns in the city of 
Hénin-Beaumont in 2008 and 2009 helped her gain more visibility at national level. She won another 
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power, resulting in the decline of the orthodox wing led by her rival, Bruno Gollnisch, 
while new ‘mariniste’ elites rose to all top-level positions 16. In the wake of their defeat in 
the 2011 party congress, Gollnisch and his followers stepped down from all official posts, 
paving the way for the strategic transformation of the party. Marine Le Pen had publicly 
indicated earlier that she would distance herself from the most radical factions of the 
French far right, which for some of them had already left the FN in 2007 17. 
 
 
2. Party organization and leadership 
 
A second set of factors concerns party organization and leadership. The rise of Marine Le 
Pen somewhat reflects the move by the FN towards greater intra-party democracy and its 
endorsement of a more open procedure of leader selection. In 2011, the decision to hold a 
competitive membership election for the new leader helped arbitrate between diverging 
strategic lines. The leadership election participated in Marine Le Pen’s momentum, as she 
took clear advantage of her position of strength in the polls. She won 67.7 per cent of the 
members’ vote in the 2011 party congress in Tours. That the vast majority of the 
grassroots were inclined towards party modernization contrasted with the previous 
balance of power in the party’s middle level elites 18. The central committee election in 
the 2011 congress showed also a rebalancing towards the ‘mariniste’ camp which won 
57 per cent of the seats against 41 per cent for Gollnisch’s supporters. 
 
With regards to de-demonization, this suggests continuity rather than significant change 
in FN personnel over time, as most of Le Pen’s close supporters have made their political 
career within the inner circles of the party. Florian Philippot or Gilbert Collard aside, no 
significant new entries have occurred and none of Gollnisch’s most prominent supporters 
have left the party since 2011. Changes which have taken place are mostly generational, 
with the rise of a younger cohort of FN elites, represented by Marine Le Pen herself. At 
grassroots level, the succession of political controversies regarding racism and anti-
Semitism since 2011 attests also to the persistence of the far right legacy. 
 
                                                                                                                                                  
personal success in the 2010 regional elections topping her father’s best performance. 
16
 After the 2011 congress, Marine Le Pen’s supporters had nearly 70 per cent of the seats in the political 
bureau. Ironically these included former mégrétistes such as Steeve Briois, Bruno Bilde or Nicolas Bay 
17
 In December 2010, Marine Le Pen said: “I don’t want radical groups, which are a political caricature and 
an anachronism, to return to the FN. Between traditionalist Catholics, pétainists and those obsessed with the 
Holocaust, it doesn’t seem coherent to me. The FN won’t serve as an echo chamber for their obsessions” 
(http://www.lefigaro.fr/flash-actu/2010/12/07/97001-20101207FILWWW00388-fn-gollnish-s-en-prend-a-
marin-le-pen.php: retrieved 6 June 2014). 
18
 In the party congress in Bordeaux in November 2007, Bruno Gollnisch had topped the central committee 
election with 85.2 per cent of the delegates’ vote ahead of Marine Le Pen (75.6 per cent). 
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Strategic considerations of candidate viability were critical in 2011. The internal 
leadership election served practically as presidential primary and there is little doubt that 
FN members saw in Marine Le Pen a candidate with stronger presidential prospects. By 
January 2011, polls were showing a wide gap in the electoral potential of the two 
contenders as well as a notable variation in their level of attractiveness to the mainstream 
right electorate 19. 
 
In policy terms, the FN has maintained a less democratic profile. Marine Le Pen’s new 
leadership shows no significant departure from the past. It features a highly centralized 
organizational structure in which power is held at the top and in which the leadership is 
relatively unconstrained in its decisions. The political bureau around Marine Le Pen 
continues to control policy making and to dominate the internal life of the FN. Kitschelt 
(1994) defines this model of hierarchical organization as “’innovation from above’, 
whereby party leaders act autonomously from a party’s internal process of interest 
aggregation” (p.212). 
 
 
3. Institutional and party system factors 
 
Finally, we must consider the incentives generated by electoral system features and 
institutional arrangements. Two important systemic challenges confront the FN. First, the 
majoritarian system, which forms the electoral backbone of the Fifth Republic, 
manufactures parliamentary majorities in ways that are primarily detrimental to minor 
party alternatives. In terms of this system, disproportionality accounts for the FN’s 
inability to win enough seats to achieve coalition potential 20. Secondly, France’s 
majoritarianism tends to a clustered multiparty system, with two separate party 
subsystems of the left and the right. This divide is deeply institutionalized, shaping the 
behavior of parties and voters. It requires that parties within each bloc co-operate to build 
competitive alliances in order to win a majority, therefore leaving little space to parties 
outside the two main blocs. 
 
De-demonization seeks to address these challenges. It aims primarily to appeal to a wider 
cross-section of voters to maximize electoral support. Mainstream politicians might 
contemplate in the future the implications of the deterioration of Front Républicain. 
Runoffs with three or more candidates promote the viability of middle-sized parties and 
the possibility that the FN will win seats without a clear majority of the votes. Moreover, 
de-demonization aims to stop political ostracism. The FN’s current accommodative 
position at local level hopes to dislodge the UMP coalition on the ground, while 
simultaneously putting the cordon sanitaire under strain. National coalitions between the 
                                                 
19
 A CSA-Marianne poll revealed for instance that 20 per cent would consider voting for Marine Le Pen in 
2012, as opposed to only 7 per cent for Gollnisch. Amongst UMP sympathisers, the comparable figures 
were 28 and 4 per cent, respectively (Marianne, 14 January 2011). A month earlier, a BVA-Canal+ poll 
had Marine Le Pen to best represent the FN’s ideas against only 3 per cent for Gollnisch: the former would 
also receive 17 per cent in the presidential election as opposed to 8 per cent for Gollnisch (BVA-Canal+, 
10 December 2010). 
20
 Let us note here that proportional representation would have given the FN up to 76 out of 577 seats in 
2012 as opposed to only 2 in the current legislature. 
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FN and the UMP look unlikely, but the normalization of the FN in the eyes of voters 
makes it increasingly difficult for the UMP to legitimate political exclusion of their 
radical challenger 21. As can be seen from Table 3, the radicalization of the mainstream 
right since 2007 has further decreased the attitudinal distance between the core support of 
both the conservative UMP and FN with regards to immigration and law-and-order 
issues. There has also been substantial increase in public support for electoral pacts 
between the moderate and the radical right: in March 2014, more than half (55 per cent) 
of UMP voters said they were in favor of local pacts with the FN as opposed to 36 per 
cent in 1998 22. 
 
 
Table 3. Cultural attitudinal polarization 
Item Left UMP FN 
There are too many foreigners in France 39 82 98 
Islam is not compatible with the values of French society 46 72 91 
In France, things were better in the past 58 80 94 
In general, foreigners don’t make much 
of an effort to assimilate in French society 
 
38 
 
71 
 
88 
People no longer feel at home 40 75 94 
Death penalty should be reinstated 22 60 79 
The FN is a useful party 20 67 95 
% of respondents who agree ; 
Source: IPSOS-CEVIPOF survey. Les Nouvelles fractures françaises, January 2014 (http://www.ipsos.fr/ipsos-public-
affairs/actualites/2014-01-21-nouvelles-fractures-francaises-resultats-et-analyse-l-enquete-ipsos-steria: retrieved 7 June 
2014) 
 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter offers an account of the current normalization of the French Front National. 
Since Marine Le Pen’s accession, the FN has been seeking a new strategic equilibrium to 
shed its pariah profile and maximize its political opportunities. Beginning with the 2002 
pyrrhic victory, the party leadership has striven to address crucial credibility and identity 
issues. This evolution attests to the current stage of the FN’s development within the 
French party system, which is that of its entrenchment. Harmel and Svåsand’s (1993) 
suggest that the final stage of populist party institutionalization targets credibility and 
cooperation. The FN succession supports their assertion that integration requires a more 
pragmatic and ‘power-seeking’ leader. 
 
In this chapter, we asked whether de-demonization has altered the populist radical right 
features of the FN as niche, radical and outsider party. We found that, despite significant 
                                                 
21
 The mainstream right’s growing difficulty maintaining a clear demarcation with the FN was revealed in 
September 2013 in the controversy by former Prime Minister François Fillon who demanded that his party 
combat ‘sectarism’ and abandon the ostracism of the FN. 
22
 http://www.atlantico.fr/decryptage/majorite-sympathisants-ump-et-fn-en-faveur-accords-locaux-sondage-
exclusif-ifop-1020547.html: retrieved 7 June 2014 
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changes in salience profile and the broadening of its economic platform, the FN has not 
yet shifted from niche to mainstream status. It has accentuated its nationalist anti-
globalization stance while endorsing left-wing economic policies. De-demonization has 
produced only limited amounts of policy moderation and change in the party’s anti-
liberal culture. The FN has primarily filtered its political rhetoric but core radical populist 
policies have not disappeared. Instead these have been diluted into a narrative of 
republican secularism employed as a strategic device to elude accusations of racism and 
xenophobia. Finally, the FN has not varied in its competitive positioning vis-à-vis other 
actors in the system. Its current position attest to the dominance of populist anti-political-
establishment strategies juxtaposed with timid efforts of opening the party locally. The 
FN continues on the other hand to be politically ostracized by its neighbouring 
competitors of the French right, although de-demonization is certainly increasing the 
pressure on the cordon sanitaire. The disappearing of the Front Républicain increases the 
political legitimacy of the FN and might create new opportunities for competition in the 
more fragmented right pole of French politics in the future. 
 
Reflecting on this persistence of the FN’s populist radical right niche status and lack of 
coalition opportunities, de-demonization can be considered a primarily vote-maximizing 
strategy and, for that matter, one that has recently been quite successful electorally. As 
suggested elsewhere in this volume, a vote-seeking strategy is the most realistic option 
for RRPPs when they are ostracized and stigmatized by their mainstream competitors. 
The French case corroborates the assumption that majority systems and cordon sanitaire 
tend to impede RRPPs to choose an office-seeking strategy. Moreover, policy profiles as 
niche, radical or outsider parties generally go well together with strategies of vote 
maximization. Policy differentiation and policy radicalism rather than competing for the 
median voter enhance niche parties’ competitiveness in elections (Ezrow 2008). 
 
The FN faces a trade-off between policy and office. On the one hand, the FN must shed 
its radical right profile to grow its representation or it will otherwise continue to alienate 
the moderate sectors of the electorate. But normalization strategies may on the other hand 
be costly in terms of votes. Niche parties risk losing their distinctiveness and support if 
they move too far beyond their core issues. Adams et al. (2006) show that niche parties 
are punished at the polls when they attempt to moderate their policy positions. 
Additionally, considering France’s current economic and political context, the FN has 
strong incentives to uphold its ‘catch-all’ populist anti-political-establishment appeal to 
mobilize a broad coalition of disenfranchised and protest voters. De-demonization aims 
therefore to resolve the somewhat antagonistic goals of dislodging the party’s radical 
right status in the eyes of the mass public on the one hand while sustaining its appeal to 
non-centrist and protest voters on the other hand. Finally, the FN will also need to address 
political co-operation with the mainstream right and, therefore, its position within 
France’s bipolar system of competition. 
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